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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case involves two separate easements claimed by Dalton Gardens Irrigation 
District ("Irrigation District") across Diane Ruddy-Lamarca's ("Ruddy-Lamarca") parcel 
contained within Tract 48 of the Dalton Gardens Addition to Hayden Lake Irrigated Tracts. 
The first easement is an express easement for the placement of canals, flumes and water tanks. 
The second easement is a prescriptive easement arising from the placement of a 4" 
underground pipeline in the proximity of the western and southern boundary of the Ruddy-
Lamarca parcel. The scope of neither easement was defined. Ruddy-Lamarca brought the 
present suit to obtain a declaration of the Irrigation District's easement rights. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Diane Ruddy-Lamarca ("Ruddy-Lamarca") agrees with the Statement of the Case 
contained in Dalton Garden Irrigation District's Statement of the Case. ("the Irrigation 
District") 
C. Concise Statement of Facts 
The Irrigation District has set forth several facts that are not disputed by Ruddy-
Lamarca in its Concise Statement of Facts. The Statement of Facts contained herein will add to 
those facts, and dispute those facts with which Ruddy-Lamarca does not agree. 
Diane Ruddy-Lamarca purchased her property in 1990. Tr p. 10, 11. 23-25, p. 11. 1. 1. 
Her title report did not reveal any easement in favor of the Irrigation District across her 
1 
property. Tr p. 12,1. 25, p. 13,11. 1-11. Lamarca became aware the Irrigation District claimed 
an easement across her property on April 1, 2008. Tr p. 13,11.12-15. 
Prior to trial, Ruddy Lamarca stipulated that her property was encumbered by an 
easement in favor of the Irrigation District for installation, construction, maintenance and repair 
of the existing 4" irrigation pipeline and appurtenances built by the Irrigation District and 
Bureau of Reclamation in 1954 and replaced in 1961. R. P. 41. However, contrary to the 
inference that the Irrigation District wishes to make on appeal, Ruddy-Lamarca did not concede 
that this easement right she stipulated to arose from the express easement that the District Court 
found the Irrigation District has over Ruddy-Lamarca's property. As will be argued later in this 
brief, there are two separate easements across Ruddy-Lamarca's property. The express 
easement does not include the existing 4" pipeline or any installation of irrigation pipelines and 
appurtenances across Ruddy-Lamarca's parcel. 
Robert Wuest testified as the water master of the Irrigation District. He was not 
disclosed as an expert pursuant to the court's pre-trial order. The Irrigation District indicated at 
trial Wuest's testimony was not admitted as an expert but was directed to testimony as an 
owner of the project and to present factors under I.C. § 42-1102 as to current construction plans 
and their reasonableness. Tr p. 122,11. 8-25; p. 12,11. 1-2. 
Mr. Wuest testified that in 1911, there was an irrigation ditch on Tract 49, immediately 
south of Tract 48 (Ruddy-Lamarca's parcel). Tr p. 35, 1. 13-25, p. 36, 11. 1-4, p. 50,11. 1-9. This 
ditch was still in existence in 1954 when the Bureau of Reclamation began its project to 
rehabilitate the irrigation system. Tr p. 36, 11. 11-22. Exhibit S. The irrigation works, 
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consisting of an underground pipeline, was moved to Tract 48 in 1954 when the project was 
constructed. Tr p. 36,11. 23-25; p. 37, 11. 1-3. With respect to line installed along the southern 
boundary of Tract 48, both Bureau plan profiles (1954 and 1961) showed construction of the 
pipeline would be six (6) feet from an existing fence line on Tract 48. Trial Exhibits U and W. 
At trial, the Irrigation District acknowledged this fact. Tr p. 42, p. 43- 11. 1-8. p. 53,11. 4-13. 
The Irrigation District and the Bureau of Reclamation had to do the project over again because 
the first pipeline did not hold up. Tr p. 43, 11. 19-25; p. 44, 1. 1-2. The Irrigation District 
acknowledged the pipeline was installed in the same location and that the new set of plans for 
the reconstruction showed the pipeline was installed six feet from the existing fence. Tr p. 44, 
11.3-23, Wuest testified the system as rebuilt in 1961 was based on the existing system of a 4" 
underground pipeline. Tr p. 148,11. 14-17. Trial exhibit W. 
Regarding the drain field improvement on Ruddy-Lamarca's property, in 1996, Ruddy-
Lamarca's drain field failed and was replaced by Kevin Bettis. Wuest told Lamarca to use 
Bettis for the repair. Tr p. 133,11. 2-15. The contractor did a "call before you dig" prior to 
commencing excavation. Tr p. 19.11. 12-25, p. 20, p. 21, 11. 1-13. Wuest knew Bettis was 
installing the drain field, because he talked to Bettis. Wuest knew the drain field would be 
adjacent to the house, yet didn't follow up on the installation. Tr p. 147,11. 17-25; p. 148,11. 1-
4. The two maple trees discussed in the Irrigation District's brief on the Ruddy-Lamarca 
property are 40-50 years old. Tr p. 74, 11. 9-25; p. 75, 11. 1-2. 
The Irrigation District now intends to abandon the 4" underground pipe in the ground 
and install a new 10" pipe parallel to it. The Irrigation District intends to use three large pieces 
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of heavy equipment to do the excavation for the replacement consisting of a 315 Caterpillar 
excavator, a Case 580C backhoe and a Case 580K backhoe. Tr p. 139, p. 140,11. 1-3. One of 
the backhoes that Wuest intends to use will be a rubber tired piece of equipment. Tr p. 118, 11. 
17-25; p. 119,11.1-2. During the 1961 reconstruction of the Bureau rehabilitation project, no 
rubber tired pieces of equipment were used. Only track hoes were used. Trial exhibits 1,2, Y, 
CC, and DD. Sterling testified that rubber tired vehicles adversely impact drain fields and 
cause them to fail, and the state of Idaho prohibits their use on drain fields. Tr p. 158, 11. 9-25, 
p. 159-160, p. 161,11. 1-23. 
Sterling testified he could accomplish the same job as proposed by the district utilizing 
only a 16' width for construction. Tr p. 101,11.12-25, p. 102,11.1-6. Sterling's proposed 
method of construction would allow construction of a 10" pipeline but would put less burden 
on the property. Ir p. 157,11. 5-19. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
The Supreme Court's standard of review in the present case was reiterated in Harris, 
Inc. v. Foxhollow Construction & Trucking, Inc. 151 Idaho 761, 264 P.3d 400,407 (2011), 
wherein this Court held: 
We review a district court's bench trial decisions to determine "whether the 
evidence supports the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support 
the conclusions oflaw." Independence Lead Mines v. Hecla Mining Co., 143 
Idaho 22,26, 137 P.3d 409,413 (2006). This Court will set aside findings of fact 
only when clearly erroneous. Id. We will not disturb findings supported by 
substantial and competent evidence, "even ifthe evidence is conflicting." Id. "It 
is the province of the district court to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony 
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and to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Thorn Springs Ranch, Inc. v. 
Smith, 137 Idaho 480, 484, 50 P.3d 975,979 (2002). We, therefore, liberally 
construe a trial court's findings "in favor of the judgment entered." Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). When it comes to matters of law, however, we are not 
bound by the trial court's conclusions; this Court is free to "draw its own 
conclusions from the facts presented." Id. 
B. Idaho Code § 42-1102 is Inapplicable to the Present Case 
The Irrigation District argues that the District Court erred in its application I.C. § 42-
1102 to this case. The Irrigation District argued in its pre-trial brief that I.C. § 42-1102 defined 
the scope of its easement. R p. 037-038. During trial, the Irrigation District introduced the 
testimony of Robert Wuest, water master, not to testify as an expert witness, but rather to 
testify as to what width was reasonable for the Irrigation District to use under I.C. § 42-1102. 
Tr p. 122,11. 15-23. In post-trial briefing, the Irrigation District again argued that the scope of 
the easement for its pipeline was governed by I.C. § 42-1102. R p. 045-046. On appeal, 
Irrigation District maintains the scope of its easement is controlled by I.C. § 42-1102. 
In interpreting statutes, this Court has held: 
The objective in interpreting a statute or ordinance is to derive the intent 
of the legislative body that adopted the act. Payette River Prop. Owners Ass'n, 
132 Idaho at 557,976 P.2d at 483 (additional citations omitted). Such analysis 
begins with the literal language ofthe enactment. Id Where the language is 
unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given 
effect, and there is no occasion for a court to consider rules of statutory 
construction. Id An ordinance is ambiguous where reasonable minds might 
differ or be uncertain as to its meaning. Id However, ambiguity is not present 
merely because the parties present differing interpretations to the court. Id 
Constructions that would lead to absurd or unreasonably harsh results are 
disfavored. Id "Language of a particular section need not be viewed in a 
vacuum. And all sections of applicable statutes must be construed together so as 
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to determine the legislature's intent." Friends 0/ Farm to Market Rd., 137 Idaho 
at 197,46 P.3d at 14. 
Spencer v. Kootenai County, 145 Idaho 448, 180 P.3d 487,494 (2008). 
A statute should be interpreted in its entirety, including the way a Title or Chapter is 
enumerated. Justice Scalia has aptly characterized this approach as "[s]tatutory construction .. 
. is a holistic endeavor. A provision ... seen in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of 
the statutory scheme - because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a context that 
makes its meaning clear, or because only one of the permissible meanings produces a 
substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law." United Savings Ass 'n v. Timbers 
o/Inwood Forest Associates, 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988). Scalia's approach was hardly novel. 
In 1850 Chief Justice Taney described the same process: "In expounding a statute, we must not 
be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions ofthe whole 
law, and to its object and policy." United States v. Boisdore's Heirs, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 
122 (1850). Thus, the meaning of a specific statutory directive may be shaped by the statute's 
overall structure. Courts also look to the broader context ofthe body oflaw into which the 
enactment fits. Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1990). 
The Irrigation District obtains its irrigation water from water drawn from Hayden Lake. 
See trial exhibits R, S and T. Idaho Code § 42-1101 states that all persons, companies and 
corporations owning or claiming any lands situated on the banks or in the vicinity of any 
stream, are entitled to the use of the waters of such stream for the purpose of irrigating the land 
so held or claimed. Idaho Code § 42-1102 indicates "[ w ] hen any such owners or claimants to 
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land do not have sufficient length of frontage on a stream to afford the requisite fall for a ditch, 
canal or other conduit on their own premises for the proper irrigation thereof, or where the land 
proposed to be irrigated is back from the banks of such stream, and convenient facilities 
otherwise for the watering of said lands cannot be had, such owners or claimants are entitled to 
a right-of-way through the lands of others, for the purposes of irrigation." 
This case does not involve lands situated on the banks or the vicinity of a stream. Thus, 
by its terms, I.C. § 42-1101, et seq. are inapplicable to the present case. To the extent the trial 
court utilized this code section in its analysis, it erred. Irrigation District's claim that the trial 
court did not properly apply I.C. § 42-1102 in the present case is an attempt to perpetuate this 
error. 
The Irrigation District contends the District Court erred in concluding that the Irrigation 
District must take reasonable precautions to preserve the two maple trees and must avoid 
damage to the septic system drain field on the Ruddy-Lamarca property because they were 
placed upon the easement without express written permission of the Irrigation District as 
required by I.C. § 42-1102. Because this code section does not apply, the District Court did not 
err . 
B There is No Express Easement for the Pipeline 
Hayden-CDA Irrigation Co. sold Tract 48 to E.H. Foltz by a Land and Water Deed 
dated July 18, 1911. Trial exhibit B. The deed reserved a right-of-way for construction, 
enlargement and maintenance of canals, flumes, and water tanks of the vendor already 
constructed or to be constructed for conveyance of irrigation water. Another portion of the 
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deed made the reserved easement appurtenant to Tract 48. The trial court found this easement 
in gross traversed a portion ofthe parcel adjacent to the southern boundary and a portion of the 
parcel adjacent to the public right of way on Sixteenth Street. (Finding No.8.) R p. 107. The 
trial court found this easement reserved for canals, flumes and water tanks. (Finding No.7.) R 
p. 107. The trial court thus concluded the Irrigation District had an express easement, but only 
for the purposes specified within the easement. (Conclusion No.1.) R p. 109. 
In Kolouch v. Kramer, 120 Idaho 65,813 P.2d 876,880 (1991) this court held: 
In construing an easement in a particular case, the instrument granting 
the easement is to be interpreted in connection with the intention of the parties, 
and the circumstances in existence at the time the easement was granted. 
Moreover, a majority of jurisdictions that have considered the issue have held 
that the easement owner is entitled to do such things as are reasonably necessary 
for the use of the easement. (Cites omitted.). The question of whether a 
particular use of an easement is reasonable and commensurate with the intention 
of the parties when the easement was granted is generally a question of fact for 
the trial court and its findings will not be disturbed if supported by substantial 
and competent evidence. (Cites omitted.) 
The trial court never entered a finding of fact whether the currently proposed 10" 
pipeline was commensurate with the intention of the parties when the easement was granted. 
As the trial court found, the Irrigation District has never constructed any flumes, canals or 
water tanks. Therefore, even though it has an express easement over Tract 48 for this purpose, 
its rights under the express easement were not at issue in this trial and did not control the scope 
of the prescriptive easement it obtained over Tract 48 for the existing 4" pipeline. 
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D. The Width of an Indefinite Easement is not Fixed by the Width Used 
During Construction 
Even ifthe deed encompassed the current 4" underground pipeline installed by the 
Irrigation District across Ruddy-Lamarca's parcel, Irrigation District is wrong that this Court 
has held that once the location of the easement is fixed by construction, its width cannot be 
changed. Irrigation District relies upon the case of Manning v. Campbell, Idaho , 
- ---
P.3d _ (Opinion No. 37728 issued January 25,2012) for this proposition. While the holding 
in this case was that the dominant estate could not reduce the width of an actively used existing 
driveway, this Court did not rule as a matter oflaw that an easement width could not be 
reduced. In fact, this Court held "The only issue in this case is whether the width or location of 
the driveway across the Manning property has changed since the driveway was initially 
constructed. In the absence of evidence that either its location or width has changed, we presume it 
has not." 
In the present case, the only evidence of use of the entire easement width claimed by the 
Irrigation District was the width allegedly used during the initial cross country construction of the 
pipeline in 1954 and reconstruction in 1961. There is no evidence that the Irrigation District ever 
used that width again. 
To the contrary, similar to other large scale cross country construction projects, the 
evidence in the record is after the project was completed, the need for the greater width no longer 
existed. The District allowed landscaping and real estate improvements to encroach into the 
original area the trial court found was used for construction. Further, the Irrigation District itself set 
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out in bylaws the width it found it needed to protect its easement rights. In a specific section 
dedicated to pipe line right of way, the District declared property owners must allow at least ten 
(10) feet on each side of the pipeline for necessary maintenance, repair, or replacement purposes. 
The District specifically noted in promulgating this bylaw that it was contemplating its needs for 
earth moving equipment. See trial exhibit 8, Article VI. Irrigation District presented nothing about 
the condition or terrain of Ruddy Lamarca's property that made the bylaw inapplicable to the 
excavation it proposed on her parcel. Instead, the water master tried to invalidate the action of the 
Board by claiming it did not know what it was doing when it passed the bylaw. 
Although the Irrigation District through its bylaws defined the widths it considered it 
currently needed for construction, the Irrigation District faults the trial court for also considering 
the normal development of the servient estate in its analysis. This Court has never ruled such 
consideration is inappropriate. In Abbott v. Nampa Sch. Dist. No. 131, 119 Idaho 544, 549-50, 
808 P.2d 1289, 1294-95 (1991), this Court held that 
Thus, the general rule concerning easements is that the right of an 
easement holder may not be enlarged and may not encompass more than is 
necessary to fulfill the easement. Id. In Merrill v. Penrod, 109 Idaho 46, 704 
P.2d 950 (Ct. App.1985), the Idaho Court of Appeals observed that an easement 
does not include the right to enlarge the use to the injury ofthe servient land. 
The use of an easement claimed under a grant or reservation 
must be confined strictly to the purposes for which it was granted or 
reserved, and in compliance with any restrictions imposed by the terms 
of the instrument. Where the grant or reservation of an easement is 
general in its terms, use of the easement includes those uses which are 
incidental or necessary to the reasonable and proper enjoyment of the 
easement, but is limited to those that burden the servient estate as little 
as possible. In other words, an easement granted or reserved in general 
terms, without any limitations as to its use, is one of unlimited 
reasonable use. It is not restricted to use merely for such purposes of 
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the dominant estate as are reasonably required at the time of the grant 
or reservation, but the right may be exercised by the dominant owner 
for those purposes to which that estate may be subsequently devoted. 
Thus, there may be an increase in the volume and kind of use of such 
an easement during the course of its enjoyment. 
25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 74, pp. 479-80 (1966). 
In Boydstun Beach Ass'n v. Allen, 111 Idaho 370, 723 P.2d 914 (Ct.App.1986), 
the Idaho Court of Appeals applied the following rule to an easement: "The rule 
is that, absent language in the easement to the contrary, the uses made by the 
servient and dominant owners may be adjusted consistent with the normal 
development of their respective lands." 111 Idaho at 378, 723 P.2d at 922. 
These "secondary easements" include the right to repair and maintain the 
primary easement and cannot be used to enlarge the burden to the servient 
estate. Such easements are to be "exercised only when necessary and in such 
a reasonable manner as not to increase needlessly the burden on ... the 
servient estate." 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 86, p. 493 (1966). 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Abbott court recognized that the use of the servient estate would change over time. 
While recognizing this fact, the Abbott court also held that secondary easements could not be 
utilized in a manner as to increase needlessly the burden on the servient estate. This same 
concept was recognized by the trial court in its findings and conclusions, although not 
enunciated in the same manner. 
The concept of "secondary easements" was first introduced in Coulsen v. Aberdeen-
Springfield Canal Co., 47 Idaho 619, 277 P. 542 (1929). Therein, the court was dealing with a 
grant that was indefinite as to width and location of the canal as well as to the character of the 
conduit to be constructed. (In this case, the conduit to be constructed was specified in the 
deed.) The court held "[t]he use to which a right of way is devoted, or for which it is created, 
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determines the character of title with which the holder is invested. The character of the use or 
the necessity of complete dominion determines the extent to which he is entitled to possession. 
No greater title or right to possession passes under a general grant than reasonably necessary to 
enable the grantee to adequately and conveniently make the intended use of his way." Coulsen 
at 628-629. However, the court did not hold that the initial exercise of the secondary easements 
forever fixed the width to be used in the future for repair, maintenance and reconstruction. In 
fact, the court held "The company, however, was entitled to no greater right than it could have 
enjoyed under an express grant by deed of right of way for waste ditch of the size and location 
and with the precise means of conducting water as that actually constructed." (Emphasis 
added.) The court concluded "[h]is estate was subject to the easement fixed by the act of the 
appellant or its predecessor in locating and constructing its canal and the implied "secondary 
easements" and it could not thereafter be subjected to a greater burden." Coulsen at 629: The 
Coulsen court further held the easement holder had the right to exercise "secondary easements" 
which accompanied the primary easement it held. Coulsen at 629-630. Thus, the Coulsen 
court recognized the secondary easements for reconstruction separate from the initial width of 
the ditch. 
In Conleyv. Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 265, 270-71, 985 P.2d 1127,1132 (1999), the Court 
indicated that the right to construct, reconstruct, repair and maintain were secondary easements. 
The court held secondary easements could not be used to enlarge the burden to the servient 
estate. although the easement owner was entitled to do such things as were reasonably 
necessary for the use of the easement. 
12 
In the present case, there was no dispute that it was necessary for the Irrigation District 
to exercise its easement rights. Rather, the dispute concerned the manner in which the 
Irrigation District wished to exercise its rights. The trial court found the proposed method of 
excavation by the Irrigation District needlessly increases the burden on the servient estate. The 
Irrigation District does not dispute this finding. Rather, it argues that its proposed method of 
excavation is within the scope of its easement because it used a wider easement width when it 
initially installed the pipeline. However, the photographic evidence supports the trial court's 
finding that the area where the pipeline was installed has evolved from an agricultural field to a 
residential area. Thus, the use of a wider construction corridor in 1954 and 1961 did not 
unduly burden the agricultural servient estate at that time. However, the use of a wider corridor 
and wheeled vehicles does unduly burden the existing residential servient estate now. The 
Irrigation District presented no valid evidence at trial why it should not proceed in a more 
circumspect manner given the change of use of the servient estate. Thus, the trial court's 
decision that the district is limited to a 16' corridor for its reconstruction is supported by 
substantial and competent evidence, and should be upheld on appeal. 
E. The Easement Obtained by Prescription did not Include the Construction Width 
Used During the Initial Installation of the Pipeline 
The trial court found that in July 31, 1953, the Bureau of Reclamation authorized an 
emergency rehabilitation of the irrigation works, the construction of which commenced June 
11, 1954. R p. 107. During this reconstruction, the Bureau eliminated the irrigation ditch on 
Tract 49, and installed an underground pipeline on Tract 48. This installation of pipeline was 
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the first use of Tract 48 as part of the irrigation system. R p. 108. The trial court found this 
construction gave the Irrigation District a prescriptive easement identical in location in width to 
the express easement. R p. 109. 
In reviewing a prescriptive easement, this court has stated: 
A determination that a claimant has established a prescriptive easement 
involves entwined questions oflaw and fact. Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 
479, 129 P.3d 1223, 1228 (2006). When this Court reviews a lower court's 
decision, it determines whether the evidence supports the findings of fact and 
whether the findings of fact support the conclusions oflaw. Anderson v. Larsen, 
136 Idaho 402,405,34 P.3d 1085, 1088 (2001). " A trial court's findings of fact 
in a bench trial will be liberally construed on appeal in favor of the judgment 
entered, in view of the trial court's role as trier of fact." Id. Findings of fact 
based on substantial and competent evidence will not be overturned on appeal 
even in the face of conflicting evidence. Benninger v. Derifield, 142 Idaho 486, 
489, 129 P.3d 1235, 1238 (2006). It is the province of the district court to weigh 
conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
Id. 
" [W]e exercise free review over the lower court's conclusion of law to 
determine whether the trial court correctly stated the applicable law, and 
whether the legal conclusions are sustained by the facts found." Anderson, 136 
Idaho at 406,34 P.3d at 1089. 
Becksteadv. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 61,190 P.3d 876,880 (2008). 
The determination of a prescriptive easement is determined by the use made during the 
prescriptive period. It is not determined based upon a single act during that period of time. As 
this Court has held: 
A party seeking to establish the existence of an easement by prescription" must 
prove by clear and convincing evidence use ofthe subject property, which is 
characterized as: (1) open and notorious; (2) continuous and uninterrupted; (3) 
adverse and under a claim of right; (4) with the actual or imputed knowledge of 
the owner ofthe servient tenement (5) for the statutory period." (Cite omitted.). 
The statutory period in question is five years. I.C. § 5-203; (Cite omitted.). 
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Akers v. D.L. White Constr., Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 127 P.3d 196,206 (2005). 
The evidence at trial was that the Irrigation District brought in excavating equipment 
and installed the pipeline improvement in 1961 across Ruddy-Lamarca's property, Tract 48. 
This event occurred once. Thereafter, during the remaining period of prescription, the property 
was used for the maintenance and operation of the pipeline for conveying irrigation water. 
Prescription acts as a penalty against a landowner and thus the rights obtained by 
prescription should be closely scrutinized and limited by the courts. The quantity of use of an 
easement obtained by prescription is determined and fixed to the right as exercised for the full 
period of time required by statute. Gibbens v. Weisshaupt, 98 Idaho 633, 638, 570 P.2d 870, 
875 (1977). Thus, during the entire period of prescription, the adverse use made of the 
property by Irrigation District did not encompass the entire width used during construction. It 
merely encompassed the area in which the pipeline was used. Further, the use was for 
transmission and delivery of irrigation water, not construction. Thus, the trial court's 
determination that the reasonable width for maintenance of this area was supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. 
F. Easement Extinguishment 
The Irrigation District claims that the drain field and the maple trees impair and impede 
its ability to reconstruct its pipeline. Ruddy-Lamarca's expert disagrees. However, assuming, 
arguendo, that these items do impair and impede the Irrigation District's easement right, these 
easement rights have been extinguished. 
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In Winn v. Eaton, 128 Idaho 670, 673, 917 P.2d 1310, 1313 (Ct.App. 1996), the Court 
of Appeals held that: 
The party asserting a claim of adverse possession must prove by clear 
and satisfactory evidence that he or she has been in exclusive possession ofthe 
property for at least 5 years and that the possession has been actual, open, 
visible, notorious, continuous and hostile to the party against whom the claim of 
adverse possession is made. I.C. §§ 5-207 through 5-210; Kolouch v. Kramer, 
120 Idaho 65, 67-68, 813 P.2d 876,878-79 (1991); Shelton v. Boydstun Beach 
Assoc., 102 Idaho 818, 819,641 P.2d 1005, 1006 (Ct.App.1982). When applied 
to extinguishing an easement, the elements of exclusivity and hostility require 
that the land owner use the property within the boundaries of the easement in a 
manner wholly inconsistent with enjoyment of the easement. Shelton, 102 Idaho 
at 820, 641 P.2d at 1007. 
The drain field improvements were known by the Irrigation District in 1996 and the 
maple trees have been in place for 40-50 years. Thus, the portion of easement encroached upon 
by the trees and drain field have been actual, open, visible, notorious, continuous and hostile 
and are extinguished. 
G. The Irrigation District in not Entitled to a New Judge on Remand 
In a passing comment dicta in the decision, the District Court commented it was 
perplexed why the case was not amenable to resolution by both parties prior to trial based upon 
financial considerations given the cost of trial. This portion of the decision was dicta and was 
not an expression of displeasure to either party as characterized by the District. Based upon 
this comment, the Irrigation District claims the District Court is now disqualified by the Section 
E(l) of the Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct because his impartiality is now questionable by the 
Irrigation District. An expression of confusion is not an expression of partiality. 
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In Beck v. Beck, 766 A.2d 482, 485 (Del. 2001), the Delaware Supreme Court visited 
the issue of whether to utilize a different trial judge on remand and held that courts should 
generally consider: (1) whether the original judge would reasonably be expected upon remand 
to have substantial difficulty in putting out of his or her mind previously-expressed views or 
findings determined to be erroneous or based on evidence that must be rejected, (2) whether 
reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice, and (3) whether reassignment 
would entail waste and duplication out of proportion to any gain in preserving the appearance 
offaimess. 
The Irrigation District claims that reassignment on remand is advisable to preserve the 
appearance of justice. To reach this conclusion, the Irrigation District makes much ado about 
nothing. The comment does not demonstrate partiality by the judge. Further, the findings of 
fact and conclusions oflaw also rejected several of Ruddy-Lamarca's contention. Thus, the 
case taken in context demonstrates the parties were treated impartially and there is no grounds 
to question the trial court's impartiality. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Irrigation District's argument that it is entitled to use the construction width found 
by the trial court to have been used during the initial construction is not supported by law or 
fact. The Irrigation District merely wishes to construct the job quickly at the expense of 
Ruddy-Lamarca's property, without heed or care for her drain field or her landscaping. The 
trial court's determination that the Irrigation District can reasonably achieve its objective with a 
17 
sixteen foot easement and giving heed to Ruddy-Lamarca's improvements is supported by 
substantial and competent evidence and should be affirmed on appeal. 
Submitted this 16th day of April 2012. 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
Susan P. Weeks, ISB #4255 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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